

Economic migration and asylum: a case for rethinking immigration policies.

Beryl Nicholson,

12 Lavender Gardens,
Newcastle upon Tyne NE2 3DE, UK
beryl1@research32.freemove.co.uk

One of the most vexed questions in relation to asylum in recent years has been the repeated accusation that asylum seekers are economic migrants abusing the system. As a consequence the two issues of asylum and economic migration have become entangled. Both are further confounded with the issue of people trafficking. To make matters worse, the concept of economic migration is used in ill-defined, often simplistic ways, which obstruct meaningful discussion of what the policy responses to it should be, and create negative stereotypes, which have been used to discredit both the economic migrants themselves, and asylum seekers.

This paper considers economic migration from one sending country, Albania, from which have come genuine asylum seekers, economic migrants who have used the asylum route (passing themselves off as Kosovars, the Albanian term for the inhabitants of Kosovo) and economic migrants who have used other routes, including legal ones. To avoid the negative connotations often associated with the term economic migrants, I shall refer to these people instead by the more precise, and positive, term, work migrants. Albania is also used as a transit point for traffickers, but that activity is, as far as I can establish, separate from economic migration, and will not be dealt with in this paper. Each sending country is different, and general prescriptions are hazardous, but lessons can be drawn from this case that are useful in others, and provide a basis for constructive discussion of the issues surrounding economic migration and asylum.

The data used are qualitative, and were obtained while undertaking a research project using participant observation in villages in South Albania.¹ Over the same period I heard frequent radio news reports on the BBC World Service about immigration and immigration policies in Western Europe, which I later followed up. This was fortuitous, but apt, as the UK is a preferred migration destination for Albanians (if not the one most go to), and Albanian nationals are among the most numerous deportees from the UK (Home Office, 2001: Table 7.2).² This juxtaposition brought into sharp relief fundamental differences between sending and host countries in perceptions of economic migration. It was clear that immigration policy in the latter rests on misconceptions about migrants in general and work migrants in particular.

Albanian emigration

The initial mass movement out of Albania when the borders opened at the beginning of the 1990s was in part for political reasons, but the vast majority who left did so to seek work and to earn more money than they could in Albania (Misja, 1998:83). There was a small upsurge in emigrants fleeing for their personal safety during the short-lived rebellion in 1997, when young men found it expedient to avoid being drawn into any of the factions. Asylum is still sought in individual cases related to criminal activity and, in North Albania, to blood feuds, but, overwhelmingly, emigration from Albania has been, and is, work migration.

In the early 1990s the Albanian economy virtually collapsed, and many factories and other installations were destroyed in the violence that followed the end of communism. The large numbers of people who lost their jobs had to find other ways of making a living. It is often overlooked that many did so in Albania, but for others the solution was to find work in another country. They saw parallels between themselves and the *Gastarbeiter* from Greece and Italy who worked in Northern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. But this wave of work migration is also a continuation of an older tradition, of periodic and seasonal work migration in the Ottoman Empire, and is referred to by the same term, '*kurbet*'.

For the most part, work migrants are not, as is so often mistakenly assumed, fleeing to a better life elsewhere, never to return. In the Albanian case migration is a solution to an immediate problem. While there are some who want to leave for good, many of whom head for North America, for the majority it is a temporary expedient. Many who left in the early years have returned and have found ways of making a living in Albania. There are no statistics, but in Albania one constantly meets people, particularly men, who have worked abroad. Others plan to return and have definite ideas about how they will achieve it (DeSoto, et al., 2001:43; Korovilas, 1999:402). Still other emigrants, including those with legal residency (such as a Green Card) in another country, wait and see, and keep their options open. Some older emigrants privately doubt that they will be able to make a living in Albania before the end of their working life, but then they may return. Others keep an open mind about returning, but few, including those who have sought to gain entry to other countries as asylum seekers, *actively* intend to leave for good. Those who have emigrated illegally expect sooner or later to return, or be sent, to Albania.³ What is important to them is not to settle, but to stay just long enough to earn sufficient money to take home.

Characteristic for Albanian migration, as for much international work migration, is a constant back and forth movement (Mancellari et al., 1996:476, 478, 484). Many migrants spend only short periods abroad. A common pattern is to stay away for a few months, even a year or so, then return for a period of residence that may or may not become permanent. It is usual to maintain a stake in Albanian society. Young men return to do military service. They marry women in Albania and establish new families there. Students working abroad continue to follow distance learning courses at Albanian universities. However, increasingly strict immigration controls in neighbouring countries in recent years are having the perverse effect of discouraging return moves because migrants are reluctant to risk losing the option of emigrating again (even if they have no definite plan to do so). Therefore this pattern has become more difficult to pursue. It has also become all but impossible for Albanians to get visas to visit relatives who have emigrated. As a consequence, family members who might otherwise have stayed in Albania emigrate, some of them illegally, to avoid prolonged separation. Thus, measures supposedly intended to limit immigration (which governments mistakenly equate with settlement), instead, increase the numbers of immigrants who, by default, for lack of alternatives, take up long-term residence.

Migration is not simply an individual matter; it is part of a household strategy. In Albania all members of a family, which may contain three or four generations, usually contribute to its total budget. For many families emigrant remittances are the single most effective means of keeping out of poverty, therefore at any one time, one or more

of their members, not necessarily always the same one, will be working abroad. In addition, emigrants release resources, land, houses, vehicles, even household items such as refrigerators, which members of their extended families use, with or without payment, for their own small-scale income generating activities while the emigrant is away. Emigrants also rent out land (or the right to specific crops it produces), small business premises, etc., so that they continue to get income from assets in Albania.

While they are abroad, work migrants live on as little as possible so they can send most of their earnings home. They are predominantly men, most often young or in early middle age. The gender division is due in part to the care Albanian families take that women's reputations are not damaged, but there is also a pragmatic reason, that, on the whole, emigrant men have greater earning power than emigrant women. Women go abroad either with their husbands, or to join their husbands, or they may join brothers who are working abroad. This marked gender imbalance is typical of work migration, not of migration for settlement.

The process of migration from Albania

There is a large, and increasing, mismatch between the numbers who at any time are trying to go abroad to work, and the numbers who can succeed in doing so. The increase is due less to a greater pressure to emigrate, indeed it has probably eased compared with a decade ago, than to the increasingly stringent immigration controls imposed by Western countries, especially since the establishment of the Schengen accord. Severe limits on the issue of visas, which are required for almost every country, even in acute humanitarian cases, mean that Albanians are shut in to a degree that people in the West would not tolerate.⁴ As a result, migrants take risks and pay large sums of money to enter other countries. If they get caught, they keep trying, ten times or more if necessary, until they succeed.

Information about the difficulty, or otherwise, of getting into different countries circulates through the bush telegraph, and is constantly refined. Emigration is a frequent topic of conversation. In this way prospective emigrants, and others, learn about possibilities for leaving the country, what they cost, and how to negotiate the more perilous and illegal routes. Prospective migrants usually have a range of sources of information and assistance available to them. Most have networks of kin and friends both in Albania and abroad. The former may act as links to those who facilitate illegal emigration, take telephone messages, make small loans to help finance a trip, or hand over the money when the migrant has safely arrived. The latter receive migrants at their destination and assist in finding work and lodgings.

It is a Western myth that people smugglers entice innocent and naïve people to migrate. People smuggling is demand-driven. The prospective emigrants themselves deliberately, though often reluctantly, seek out the smugglers, document forgers, and other providers of services on the black market. While many people have a distaste for those who engage in the trade and profit from it, they consider emigrants are justified in using their services because there are no legal alternatives, and they display a quiet glee that, Albanians, perceived to be underdogs, fool authorities they see as unjust. Most people maintain their personal integrity by keeping their distance from illegal activities and by not knowing more than they need to for their own purposes, and ordinary, decent people find it hard to engage in illegal acts. I witnessed one person on the way to obtain a photograph to replace the one in a borrowed passport, after much

anguished discussion, turn back. Others swallow hard, and do what they believe has to be done.

People smuggling, in Albania at least, is not, as some mistakenly argue, a business (e.g. Salt, 2001:89), rather it is a cottage industry. Transactions are carried on through networks with many small players, who all get a share of the proceeds. Some will be frustrated work migrants, who get drawn into the fringes of criminal activity to earn a little money. Unlike Embassies, which require non-refundable payments for visas at the time of application, payment to smugglers is only made when the migrant has safely arrived at the destination (though the amount asked for may be higher than the one agreed). The only money handed over in advance is a smallish sum paid when the first contact is made to show good faith.

There is an inverse relationship between cost and the danger and discomfort of the various routes (see Nicholson, 2002). The cheapest way to cross the border is to go over the mountains to Greece on foot, with or without the help of a guide, which is risky, and is thought unsuitable for women. Considerable resources are devoted to hunting Albanians on the Greek side. The least costly way to get to Italy is to take a dangerous, and unpleasant, night trip in an open boat (*skaf*). For a higher price, a passport containing a visa can be borrowed and the photograph replaced (this is another cottage industry), which enables the emigrant to travel to Italy in more comfort and safety by ferry. False documents and an air ticket from Albania to London cost about twice as much again. Schengen visas can also be obtained. For those who can pay the most, there is a black market in genuine visas. American visas are in most demand, and seem to be available in some numbers. Arrangements are made through chains of contacts linked to persons in embassies and consulates. Probably the most notorious source of black market visas is a Greek Consulate where few visas are issued officially, but the illegal trade is a thriving, and lucrative, sideline for officials. The trade continues after emigration, and is evidently a widespread. Many emigrants report 'buying' (residence) documents in Greece (c.f. Greek Helsinki Monitor, 11 July 2001).

Migration as investment

The large sums of money that migrants pay, and the risks they take, are indicative of their determination to find work, to help themselves. Migrating illegally is a wager, which they might lose, but they know they will definitely lose if they do not migrate. It is, indeed, economic risk-taking, if of an unconventional kind. Emigrants want to work and to earn, and save, money. They do not want to live on the pittance paid out in social benefits, as some in the West mistakenly believe. The highly publicised cases of small numbers of people coming to the West, ostensibly because they believe they can live without working, are atypical. The costs of migrating are an investment of a small sum so that the emigrant can earn much more.

Though the immediate imperative for emigration is to family maintenance, it is also the aim of many to amass savings, which increase in value when they are repatriated. Emigrants' remittances to Albania are estimated to represent about 18 percent of GDP, or US\$530 million per annum (DeSoto et al., 2001: 35n.); some sources suggest the figure is substantially higher (Korovilas, 1999:404). The most common intention is to build a new house, or improve and extend an old one (Misja, 1998:91). From the late 1990s this has taken on ever-greater proportions, especially in Tirana and the south. It is a major factor in maintaining the building industry as a leading sector of the

Albanian economy, and has led to the growth of businesses that produce, import, and sell building materials. Emigrants have thus enabled many of their fellow countrymen to earn a living without leaving the country, and have returned themselves to work in the building trade, bringing skills learnt abroad.

Savings are also invested in on-going or new small businesses, one person or family, enterprises, the joint enterprise of two or more brothers or other relatives, or, in the building trade, 'brigades' of half a dozen men. Going abroad to work is an important means to overcome the shortage, and expense, of credit. Many also prefer to avoid getting into debt. Savings may form the entire start capital, or may be just one element in a package put together from several sources, such as loans within an extended family. Alternately, it may be used to buy equipment to improve the productivity and efficiency of moneymaking activities the emigrants and their families already engage in (Nicholson, 2001:39-41). Survey evidence from a sample of small businesses showed that migrants' savings made up 17 percent of investment, considerably more than was obtained from financial institutions (Kule et al., 1999:8-9)

The businesses that have been at least partly financed in this way include some of the many new shops. Small workshops have come into existence, making window frames and fitted cupboards, or repairing shoes, using machinery bought by money earned abroad. There are also filling stations, bars, fast food outlets, minibus services, haulage and various forms of trading, such as buying or selling agricultural produce. Some of this latter activity started by using public transport and bicycles, then periods of work abroad made possible the purchase of vehicles. Migrants who return to villages have bought tractors, equipped with trailers, or other machinery. They are used for contract agricultural work, for which there is a ready market, and for haulage.

Some of the new businesses have enabled people with skills to use them to create a livelihood for themselves, such as a goldsmith who has built himself a shop. Still others have brought back and used new skills and ideas. Indeed, to simplify just a little, one might say that whereas emigrants on the whole tend to be deskilled, in that highly skilled and educated people take unskilled work, those who return are more likely to do work that is more skilled. A common pattern is for returned emigrants to replicate the enterprise or industry they worked in. Techniques of growing vegetables under plastic, learnt in Greece, are used increasingly, and copied by others, and have contributed to the rising proportions of Albanian produce available in the markets. The flourishing building industry has provided a market for several new paint factories and workshops producing metal railings and gates, and aluminium windows and doors, which use skills and contacts with suppliers the owners acquired while working abroad, and, crucially, the capital they accumulated.

Migration as development

Returned migrants make a life for themselves in Albania that is often demanding, even difficult, but is less uncongenial than that of an emigrant. Some make a comfortable living, and get satisfaction from working for themselves, and not for others. Though in some quarters (e.g. the World Bank, see DeSoto, 2001:XII, 28, 31) the significance of these small businesses is played down, they give work and a livelihood to many people, and they make an important contribution to the economy and to longer term economic growth (c.f. Korovilas, 1999:407). The costs of returned migrants are low, so they give better value for money than conventional development aid, and they

produce results faster. It appears that, overall, they have a higher success rate, and their total effect on the economy is probably greater. Unlike conventional development aid based on 'hand-outs', work abroad is a 'hand-up' for people who want to help themselves,⁵ but one that, as yet, Western nations are unwilling to countenance. It is more than a little ironic that the countries that put up barriers to immigration, are the same ones that give development aid to the immigrants' home countries, without apparently recognising that the one undermines the other.

Benefits of migration to host countries

The benefits to host countries are usually considered to be what immigrants bring to the host economy, and then only in a limited, politically acceptable way. In two major documents on immigration published in Western Europe in the past year or so (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2001; Home Office, 2002), these benefits are discussed in terms of immigration of people who can fill skill shortages in certain industries, or specific labour shortages at certain seasons, or who are likely to make investments. Other benefits, including those from the black economy, are rarely acknowledged, but are significant. Estimates show that illegal immigration has resulted in a measurable rise in the level of GDP in Greece (Lianos, et al., 1997:462). Migrants also make their own calculations of the profits that are made out of them by, for example, landlords. The evidence from Albania suggests there are still further benefits to the host country from short-term work migration, at all skill levels, after migrants return home.

These benefits are mostly related in some way to personal contacts that are formed between the migrants and the (former) host country. At the most elementary level, returned migrants create a demand for products they have become accustomed to buying while they worked abroad. The benefits of the contacts of elites are already recognised in host countries, those of others less so. Yet the economic value of the contacts of other work migrants are potentially greater, given their larger numbers and their experience of a wide range of branches and levels of the economy of the host country. Not least, the goodwill of former employees, combined with their knowledge of both countries, can have substantial benefits for their erstwhile employers. Returnees are conduits for exports to their home countries. Albanians who have returned from Italy and Greece have set up businesses importing and selling goods from those countries, in some cases, their former employers' products. They thus enable even small firms to gain a toehold in foreign markets. Those who set up their own businesses use contacts made while abroad to access supplies, again benefiting their former host country. Circumstantial evidence of links to former host countries from countries of earlier emigration (lorries that ply regular routes from Greece to unlikely small towns in Germany, products manufactured on license, and the origins of manufactured goods in Greek shops) suggests these benefits continue to be felt in the long term.

Work migrants, immigration policy and development

I have consistently used the term 'work migrants', not 'economic migrants', to emphasise that these are people who migrate to earn money by *working*, not to enjoy the fruits of other people's labours. It also distances the discussion from simplistic, indeed erroneous, connotations of mass movements of people to places where they can enjoy a better life, intending to settle, on the pattern of the, largely white, movements of colonisation in the past. The implication of improved communications and

globalisation, is not that there will necessarily be huge shifts of population from one part of the globe to another (as the invitation to this conference, rather alarmingly, implies).⁶ It is that a larger proportion of migration than in the past is likely to take the form of back and forth or repeat moves. To emphasise this point is not to adopt the agenda of the extreme right, but to argue that it is based on false premises. As I have already indicated, a great deal of work migration does not (and never did) lead to settlement, or only does so by default, as a perverse consequence of policies intended to limit 'immigration' (meaning settlement), and may not be sought by migrants.

Until more people can find a job and make a living in the countries from which work migrants come, they will seek work elsewhere, whatever the obstacles put in their way. People in poorer countries have become more assertive. Many of them are not prepared simply to resign themselves to a life without work. The policies of deterrence currently pursued do not, and will not, prevent people migrating to seek work, and, where there are no other alternatives, doing so illegally. They only benefit those who make money out of smuggling people (and the bigger criminals for whom they provide a shield). They impose considerable costs on everyone else, and ultimately prolong the necessity for work migration. Prevention is not an available option. If the West is to solve the problems associated with work migration: people smuggling, illegal migration and immigrants working in the black economy, it must work *with* migrants, not against them. It must pursue policies that mobilise the potential of work migrants to promote development, and thus reduce the need for work migration in the future.

In Albania, work migrants themselves have evolved a strategy that serves as an example of how this might be done if work migration were to become a part of development policy, and immigration rules were adjusted so as to allow regularised periods of work abroad. To be effective, stays abroad would have to be long enough for the migrant to acquire substantial savings (see Dustman, 1996:238; McCormick & Wahba, 2001:175, 176), learn skills and make contacts, but they could also include safeguards to ensure return. One such might be to hold back portions of earnings, which would be paid out on the migrant's return (c.f. Gibney, 2000:48). A further possibility might be to channel development aid through returning migrants, perhaps as matching finance for their investments. This would be an incentive to return, but also effective development. Encouraging the building of links between work migrants and their employers and potential suppliers would further contribute to development, while also bringing tangible benefits to host countries. Schemes that allowed employers to hire immigrants with the aim of opening export markets might usefully be considered.

While work migration is not an attractive option for those who undertake it, the alternatives, unemployment and acute poverty, are less attractive still. Regularised movement, even with strict conditions attached would vastly improve the situation of both migrants and the people they leave behind, as well as solving problems in host countries. It would significantly reduce the stresses of illegal migration, especially long separations currently experienced by families, and the hardships of those with no income from abroad, and it would go a long way to releasing the frustration that is increasingly evident. It would also divert the large amounts of money spent on migrating illegally back to the legal economy, where it too could be put to more effective use in raising living standards or in investment. The ultimate outcome of using work migration as a means of development would be to put an end to the need for emigration from a particular country, perhaps within a generation, if not sooner.

In many other parts of the world the problems associated with work migration are more acute and complex than in Albania. Solutions need to be sought, and immigration policies formulated, for each sending country individually. This is already done in relation to rules governing visas. However, the basic principles are the same: they are to recognise that work migration does not take place in a vacuum, and to aim to turn it into a tool to change the situation that gives rise to it, so that it becomes unnecessary.⁷

Economic migrants and asylum

A more measured approach to work migrants, and regularisation of work migration where illegal routes are currently used, would divert work migrants from using the asylum route as a last resort. Those fleeing persecution and seeking asylum would be less exposed to suspicions about their true intent. However, the principles outlined above could also be of more direct relevance to refugees and asylum seekers.

As is the case with work migrants, asylum seekers are reluctant migrants who generally want to return home. When they do, it is often to a developing country, frequently one ravaged by conflict. The benefits returning work migrants bring when they return home are also those that are needed in the home countries of refugees. This is a strong argument (though none should be needed) for allowing refugees to work, and to obtain capital, skills and ideas for their return, as work migrants do. There is even a case for allowing them to continue to work abroad during an initial rebuilding phase so they can contribute remittances to families who are otherwise dependent on international aid. This would reduce the burden on aid donors, as well as alleviating the crises in aid delivery that almost always seem to arise, and allow returning refugees the self-respect of being self-sufficient.⁸

In addition, refugees, in the same way as work migrants, would continue to benefit former host countries after their return home. There must be at least anecdotal evidence of returning refugees introducing foreign products, as imports or producing them on licence. A useful piece of research, if it has not been done already, would be to quantify the benefits that accrue to countries that have hosted refugees once they return home. While some may be reluctant to draw attention to gains that result from other people's misfortune, governments which face opposition from sizeable segments of their populations would be able to point to the positive side of the balance sheet of taking in refugees.

The use of the 'economic' tag to deny asylum claims makes it imperative to obtain greater clarity about the nature of 'economic' movements in sending countries. A more sophisticated approach to 'economic' migrants is also necessary. The unthinking equation by politicians and others concerned with asylum, of literally fleeing to escape persecution, with the metaphor of 'fleeing' poverty, is both inaccurate and seriously damaging to those who genuinely need shelter. The assimilation of poverty and insecurity in the announcement for this conference is an unfortunate example of this. The muddling of fundamentally different phenomena fuels the widespread prejudice that people who flee for their lives are, in fact, seeking the good life, preferably at the expense of others, and undoubtedly leads to the denial of asylum or shelter in cases where it is warranted. Just changing the terminology used, and referring to work migrants instead of economic migrants, given the stigma attached to the latter term, would go some way to countering such prejudice.

In the face of the widespread opposition to all immigration, including asylum, I do not underestimate the obstacles that would face any attempt to introduce policies based on the ideas I have outlined. Nonetheless, the argument I have sought to elaborate is that, in the interests of all of us, no time should be lost in beginning the task of turning immigration policy in a more positive and constructive direction.

Notes

1. The project 'Life in rural South Albania from women's perspective' financed by grants from the British Academy and the Leverhulme Trust.
2. In this paper the term 'Albanian' refers solely to citizens of the Republic of Albania.
3. Illegal immigrants who return home do so by conventional routes, so at some level in the respective immigration services, even if statistics are not kept, there must be an impression of how many leave.
4. Commercial visas seem to be issued relatively freely. Practice on visas for family unification varies between countries. For visitors' visas a sponsor in the country concerned is generally required, even for short cross-border visits to Greece by people beyond working age. Visas to Greece are issued to certain ethnic minorities, and, with reluctance and delays, for humanitarian reasons. It is generally assumed in Albania that practice is influenced by the desire by officials to maximise income from the sale of visas on the black market. Only Montenegro, Kosova, Macedonia (FYROM) and Turkey do not require visas from Albanian citizens.
5. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in a speech to the Ghanaian parliament, 8 February 2002, said '... If we are going to make faster progress in development we need a fundamental conceptual shift in our approach to aid. Not aid as a hand-out but aid as a hand-up, to help people to help themselves. <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page4399.asp>
6. 'In recent years, substantial numbers of people have migrated - or sought to migrate - from regions that are afflicted by poverty and insecurity to more prosperous and stable parts of the world. By the year 2000, the United Nations estimated that about 140 million persons - or roughly two percent of the world's population - resided in a country where they were not born.'
7. One might speculate, though it goes beyond the scope of this paper, that earlier examples of settlement abroad might have turned out differently if principles such as these had been adopted. One might also speculate that levels of development in sending countries might have been higher than they are today.
8. These comments are related to a further juxtaposition, that of the arguments in this paper with two concurrent news items. The first was that UNHCR, is running out of money in Afghanistan because so many refugees have already returned (The Guardian, London, 9 July 2002). The other said the same body, UNHCR was going to cooperate with returning Afghans, now no longer regarded as needing to seek asylum, from the Sangatte refugee camp (where people seeking asylum in the UK gather) in France (BBC World Service, 12 July 2002).

References:

Bundesministerium des Innern, 2001. **Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission 'Zuwanderung'**. Berlin. www.bmi.bund.de/top/dokumente/Artikel/ix_46876.htm (full report). www.bmi.bund.de/top/dokumente/Artikel/ix_47176.htm (summary of report).

DeSoto, Hermine, Peter Gordon, Ilir Gedeshi and Zamira Sinoimeri 2001. **A Qualitative Assessment of Poverty in 10 Areas of Albania**. Final Draft. World Bank, Washington, DC. June 30.

Dustmann, Christian 1996. Return migration: the European experience. **Economic**

Policy 22:213-242.

Gibney, Matthew J. 2000. **Outside the protection of the law: the situation of irregular migrants in Europe**. RSC Working Paper No.6. Oxford:Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

Greek Helsinki Monitor 11 July 2001. **Illegal request to buy Social Security Stamps to secure legalization from migrants with proven long stay in Greece**.
<http://www.greekhelsinki.gr>

Home Office 2001. **Control of Immigration: Statistics United Kingdom, 2000**.
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/immigration1.html>.

Home Office 2002. **Secure Borders, Safe Haven. Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain**, CM 5387. London: HMSO.

Korovilas, James P. 1999. The Albanian economy in transition: the role of remittances and pyramid investment schemes, **Post-Communist Economies** 11(3):399-415.

Kule, Dhori, Ahmet Mancellari, Harry Papanagos, Stefan Qirici and Peter Sanfey 1999. The causes and consequences of Albanian emigration during transition: evidence from micro-data, Working Paper No. 46, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London. <http://www.ebrd.com>

Lianos, Theodor P., Alexander H Sarris, Louka T. Katseli 1997. Illegal immigration and local labour markets: The case of Northern Greece, **International Migration** 34(3):449-484.

McCormick, Barry and Jackline Wahba 2001. Overseas work experience, savings and entrepreneurship amongst return migrants to LDCs, **Scottish Journal of Political Economy** 48(2):164-178.

Mancellari, Ahmet, Harry Papanagos & Peter Sanfey 1996. Job creation and temporary emigration: the Albanian experience, **Economics of Transition** 4(2):471-490.

Misja, V. 1998. **Emigracioni ndërkombëtar në Shqipëri gjatë periudhës së tranzicionit**. Tiranë: Shtëpia Botuese Marin Boleti.

Nicholson, Beryl 2001. 'From migrant to micro-entrepreneur: Do-it-yourself development in Albania', **South-East Europe Review**, 4(3):39-41.

Nicholson, Beryl, 2002. The wrong end of the telescope: Economic migrants, immigration policy, and how it looks from Albania. **The Political Quarterly** 73(4) (forthcoming).

Salt, John 2001. The business of international migration, in M.A.B. Siddique ed., **International migration in the 21st century**. Cheltenham:Edward Elgar: 86-108.